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Abstract— This article shows that credit market 
imperfections have important implications for the 
distribution of policy rents. In a model with land as fixed 
factor and credit market imperfections, when an area 
payment is given, land rents go up by more than the 
subsidy. On aggregate farms may lose from the subsidy. 
The results depend on the extent to which subsidies have 
direct and indirect effects on the credit constraints, on 
whether farms rent or own land, and on farm 
heterogeneity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
There is an extensive literature on the distributional 
effects of agricultural policy, or what Alston and James 
(2002) refer to as the “incidence of agricultural policy”.
1 An 
influential study by the OECD came to the conclusions that 
only 20% of all market and price support in OECD 
countries resulted in net farm surplus gains; the rest was 
dissipated to others, including owners of production factors 
(OECD, 2001b). Studies have analyzed how these effects 
differ among polices (Alston and James, 2002; de Gorter 
and Meilke, 1989; Dewbre, Anton and Thompson, 2001; 
Gardner 1983; Guyomard, Mouel and Gohin, 2004), or how 
the results change if one includes more agents along the 
vertical chain (Desquilbet and Guyomard, 2002; Sheldon, 
Pick, and McCorriston, 2001).   
 The distribution of policy rents is also influenced by 
imperfections in policies and markets. Two types of 
imperfections have been studied: imperfect competition and 
imperfect implementation.  Among others, McCorriston and 
Sheldon (1991) and Salhofer and Schmid (2004) have 
analyzed how imperfect competition in up- or downstream 
sectors affect the distribution of policy rents.  Others, 
                                                           
1 These issues are different from but related  to analyses of 
distortions caused by policies which have received renewed 
attention in the current WTO negotiations and policy reforms 
leading up to it.  For example, an important issue is whether 
“decoupled policies” are truly decoupled (e.g. Chau and de Gorter 
2005; de Gorter 2007; Goodwin and Mishra, 2006; Hennessy, 
1998; OECD, 2001a; Serra et al, 2005; Sckokai and Moro, 2006). 
including OECD (2007), de Gorter (1992), Munk (1994), 
and Vatn (2001) have analyzed the implications of 
transaction costs and constraints in the implementation of 
the polices.   
  However, little attention has been paid to constraints in 
factor markets in this literature.  The reason is probably that 
this literature has strongly focused on OECD countries.  In 
contrast, studies analyzing effects of agricultural polices in 
developing or transition countries, often include market 
imperfections as key feature of their models (e.g. Bellemare 
and Barrett 2006; Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharyya, and 
Kumbhakar, 1996; Fafchamps and Hill 2005; de Janvry, 
Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991; Rizov and Swinnen, 2004; 
Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Benjamin, 1998). However the 
focus of these studies is how market imperfections affect 
reactions of agents to policy changes and not the 
distribution of policy rents. 
 A first attempt to address this shortcoming was by 
Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) who analyze how imperfections 
in land markets affect the distributional effects of 
agricultural polices in Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
  Nobody, to our knowledge, has analyzed the impact of 
credit market imperfections on the incidence of agricultural 
polices.
 This is somewhat remarkable given the prevalence 
of credit market imperfections in agriculture. It is well 
known that rural credit market imperfections are widespread 
in developing and transition countries (eg. Carter, 1988; 
Swinnen and Gow, 1997).
 2 However, studies show that also 
in the US and the EU, farms’ access to credit is constrained. 
In an empirical study of French farmers, Blancard et al 
(2006) find that two-thirds of the farmers in their sample are 
credit constraint in the short run and all of them are credit 
constrained in the long run.  Lee and Chambers (1986) and 
Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee (1990) find that at least part of the 
US farms in their study are credit constrained.  
 The objective of the present paper is to analyze how 
credit constraints affect the distributional effects of subsidy 
programs. The policy on which this paper focuses is an area 
payment (subsidies per unit of agricultural land). Area 
payments are an important form of agricultural subsidies. In 
                                                           
2  There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on 
imperfections in rural credit markets, including the seminal work 
of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).     2 
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2007, the EU alone spent 30 billion euros on area payments.  
The importance of area payments as policy instrument is 
reflected in the fact that several recent studies have analyzed 
their effect, including Alston (2007), Kirwan (2005), OECD 
(2005).  However none of these studies considers the effect 
of imperfect credit markets.  
  The paper is organized as follows. We first explain the 
basic model and derive the equilibrium without credit 
constraints. Then we introduce credit constraints and show 
how the equilibrium changes. Next, we analyze the effect of 
area payments, and we use a simulation exercise to illustrate 
the impact of several variables. The final section concludes.  
II. THE MODEL  
Consider an agricultural economy with n identical farms. 
The output of each farm is a function of the amount of land 
( A) and non-land inputs (K ), which we refer to as 
“fertilizer” but which captures also other capital inputs used 
by the farm. The production function is represented by 
) , ( K A f  with  0 > i f ,  0 < ii f ,  0 > ij f , for i, j = A 
and K.   Total land available is assumed to be fixed, 
T A . 
End of the season profits are: 
(1)  ) 1 ( ) , ( i kK rA K A pf + − − = ∏  
where p is the price of the final product, r is the price of 
land,  k  is the per unit price of fertilizers and i  is interest 
rate. We assume that the economy is small and open, which 
implies that the fertilizer price and the output price are 
fixed. Similarly, we assume that agriculture is small in 
terms of the credit use and agricultural loans will therefore 
not affect interest rates. 
An important issue is the timing of the various activities 
and payments throughout the season.  We assume that 
fertilizers have to be paid at the start of the season while 
payment of land rents to owners and farms’ revenues from 
selling the harvest occur at the end of the season, after 
harvest.
3 
 Other inputs, i.e. fertilizer K, need to be financed 
at the start of the season. This can be done through internal 
finance (savings or cash flow) and /or through credit. 
                                                           
3 Although there are no systematic data on this, our inquiries 
indicate that these assumptions are consistent with reality. When 
land rents are paid in kind or through sharecropping this obviously 
implies that they are paid after the harvest; but also cash payments 
tend to be paid at the end of the year/season. 
 
A. Perfect Credit Market 
To establish a point of comparison let us first identify the 
equilibrium without credit market constraints. With perfect 
credit markets, farms are not constrained on the quantity of 
inputs they use. Farms will choose the quantity of land and 
fertilizer that will maximize their profits given by equation 
(1). This implies the following equilibrium conditions (for 
notational simplicity the interest rate i is set equal to zero 
( 0 = i )): 
4 
(2)  0 = − r pf A  
(3)  0 = − k pfK  
(4) 
T A A =  
Conditions (2) ─ (4) determine the farm’s input demand 
functions. Total land demand is the aggregate of all n farms 
land demand functions and represented by function D in 
figure 1. For illustrative purposes we use linear functions in 
the figures. The results which we illustrate hold in general, 
as proven by the mathematical derivations. In figure 1, with 
fixed land supply 
T A  and land demand D, the equilibrium 
rent is 
* r .  
 The distribution of policy rents resulting from area 
payments in this case are well known. When there is one 
input fixed in supply and with fixed prices of other inputs 
and fixed output price, farmers will not benefit from 
subsidies and all benefits will go to the suppliers of the 
inelastic input, land in this case (see e.g. Alston and James, 
2002; Alston, 2007; Gardner, 1983; Just, Hueth, and 
Schmitz 2004).  
However, this conclusion assumes that credit markets 
work perfectly (or, in other words, that there are no 
constraints on the supply of other inputs (fertilizers)). In the 
next section we will show that these results change when 
access to credit is constrained. 
B. Imperfect Credit Market 
To model the imperfect credit market, we use the 
approach of Feder (1985) and Carter and Wiebe (1990) by 
introducing a farm credit constraint.
5  It is assumed that the 
                                                           
4 While this may appear at first sight as a strange assumption in an 
analysis of credit market imperfections, this assumption does not 
affect the results because credit market imperfections in this paper 
are modelled as constraints on the amount of credit rather then its 
cost, as is standard in the literature (see further). Hence setting i=0 
merely simplifies the notation, but does not affect the results.  
 
5 See also Carter (1988) for a credit rationing model for the farm 
sector in the context of developing countries and Barry and   3 
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maximum amount of credit available to a farm (S ) depends 
on farm characteristics (W ) such as reputation, farm size 
and wealth. That is  () W S S =  with  0 > W S . The credit 
constraint is given by: 
(5)  ) (W S kK ≤  
With a credit constraint the decision-making problem of 
the farms is the maximization of the end-season profit 
functions, as given by equation (1), subject to credit 
constraint (5), as represented by the LaGrangean function: 
(6)  () S kK kK rA K A pf − − − − = Ψ λ ) , (  
where λ  is the shadow price of the credit constraint.   
When the credit constraint is binding farms cannot use 
the unconstrained optimal level of fertilizers and fertilizer 





= . Farms then choose their 
land allocation to maximize profits, treating fertilizer use as 
fixed.
6  
The optimal conditions with binding credit constraints 
( 0 > λ ) are given by (4) as well as by: 
(7)  0 = + r pf A  
(8)  () 0 1 = + − λ k pfK  
(9)  0 = − S kK . 
From equation (8) it follows that the marginal value 
product of fertilizers is higher than the marginal cost of 
fertilizers k:  k pfK > . By increasing fertilizer use the farm 
could increase its profit but it cannot use more fertilizer 
because of the credit constraint.  From the characteristics of 
the production function ( 0 > AK f ) it also follows that 
credit constraints affect the land market. Ceteris paribus, the 
more credit constrained farms are, the less fertilizers they 
can use, the lower their productivity, and hence the lower 
their land demand. 
The effect of credit constraints on the land market is 
illustrated in figure 1. As explained before, the aggregate 
land demand curve without credit constraints is D.  The 
equilibrium rent without credit constraints is 
* r . When 
credit is constrained, farm land demand shifts to Dc. At low 
                                                                                                  
Robinson (2001) for a more elaborate discussion of credit markets 
in agriculture. 
 
6 In similar context Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (2004) analyze the 
welfare measurement with constrained input use due to policy 
intervention. The difference here is that we consider the input 
constraint caused by insufficient credit and its interaction with area 
payments. 
 
levels of output (and thus land use) the credit constraint is 
not binding, and the constrained demand curve Dc coincides 
with the unconstrained demand curve D. This is up to the 
point  x  where the credit constraint becomes binding and 
the constrained demand curve shifts below the 
unconstrained demand curve. The gap between D  and  c D  
increases for higher levels of land as the reduction in 
productivity caused by the credit constraint increases. With 
the credit constraint binding, and reflected in  c D , the new 
equilibrium land rent is 
*
c r . The equilibrium rent declines 
to 
* * r rc < .  
Notice that while land demand is affected, land use is not 
affected in figure 1. The functions, as drawn, assume that 
even with credit constraints the marginal value products of 
all the land available (A
T) is positive (as the land demand 
function still lies above the vertical axis at A
T). Hence, if 
this is the case, all the adjustments in the land market occur 
through price adjustments while in the fertilizer market they 
occur through quantity adjustments with fixed prices. 
III. IMPACT OF AREA PAYMENTS 
Define s as the subsidy (area payment) per unit of land, 
and assume that all land in the analysis qualifies for the 
subsidies.
7  The representative farm objective function then 
changes to  
(10)  kK A s r K A pf − − − = ∏ ) ( ) , ( . 
However, not only the objective function will change; 
also the credit constraint is affected.  The payments will 
alleviate the credit constraint of the farm.  In reality farms 
may receive the subsidies at the beginning or at the end of 
the season. It may be at the end because of administrative 
delays or because of administrative controls to check the 
eligibility of the farms which need to take place during the 
growing season.
8 
If the farm receives the subsidies at the beginning of the 
season, farm can use the funds directly to pay for the 
                                                           
7 In reality, policies may impose restrictions on which land can 
receive payments. Restrictions may relate to crop choice, set-aside 
requirements, cross-compliance, etc. These restrictions may affect 
the distributional effects. Here we analyze the case when all land 
does qualify for subsidies. 
 
8 For example, the EU has so-called cross-compliance conditions 
for subsidies which require good agricultural practices, implying, 
among other things, that environmental criteria have to be 
satisfied. 
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fertilizer. However, even if farms receive subsidies at the 
end of the season, this can still improve their access to 
credit. If farms and potential lenders know that subsidies 
will be paid at the end of the season, then farmers may be 
able to use these future (guaranteed) payments to obtain 
credit from credit institutions at the beginning of the season. 
For example, our own research in Eastern Europe showed 
that the provision of area payments under the EU’s CAP 
had a major effect on farms’ access to credit. We found 
from field interviews that banks and other lenders are more 
willing to provide credit to farms when they know that such 
subsidies will be paid. In a sense, (the promise of) subsidies 
are used as collateral for credit. For example, banks in 
Slovakia provide credit to farms up to 100% of their area 
payments in 2007, so the farms can use the funds to finance 
expenses at the start of the growing season. To obtain such 
loans, the farms need to have an account at the bank where 
the area payments will be deposited later by the official 
paying agency, and the banks have control over the account 
in order to recuperate the pre-financing.    
In our analysis, we allow for subsidies to arrive either at 
the start of the season or after harvest.  With area payments 
the credit constraint is given as follows: 
(11)  sA W S kK α + ≤ ) ( , 
where  1 0 ≤ ≤α , and α  measures the extent to which the 
farm can use subsidies to alleviate its credit constraint. If 
the farm receives subsidies at the beginning of the season, 
the farm can use all subsidies to alleviate the credit 
constraint: in this case  1 = α . However, if the farm 
receives the subsidy at the end of the season, it may obtain 
an amount of credit equivalent to the size of the subsidy or 
less, depending on the farm’s ability to borrow.  In this case 
1 0 ≤ ≤α .  
 
Proposition 1: When farms are credit constrained it holds 
that with the introduction of area payments (and with 
0 > α ) land rents increase by more than the subsidy. 
Proof: the proof can be obtained from authors. 
 
Land rents will increase with area payments, but contrary to 
when there are no credit constraints, the increase in rent is 
higher than the allocated subsidy, s. This is because the 
payments have two effects on land rents, a direct and an 
indirect one. This is illustrated in figure 2. The initial 
equilibrium rent with credit constraints is rc
*. The first, 
direct, effect is the standard effect of subsidies with a fixed 
production factor (land): because farms are granted 
subsidies per hectare they rent, this increases marginal 
returns to land, and increases farms’ willingness to pay a 
higher rent equivalent to the size of the subsidy s. This 
effect is reflected in the upward parallel shift of land 
demand  c D  to  s Dc + . This effect alone would result in 
land market rent, rcs
s. The increase in rent is equal to the 
size of the subsidy s: rcs
s - rc
* = s. 
The second, indirect, effect is that the subsidies relax 
farms' credit constraints which allows farms to purchase 
more fertilizer. This increases the marginal value product of 
land if farms are credit constrained and further increases 
farms’ land demand, thereby inducing a higher rent, 
reinforcing the first, direct, effect. This second effect results 
in a further shift of land demand from  s Dc +  to Dcs. The 
equilibrium rent is rcs
*. It is clear from figure 2 that the rent 
rises by more than the subsidy, rcs
* - rc
* > s. 
The size of this second effect depends on the impact of 
the subsidy on the credit constraint. In figure 2 we assume 
that the subsidy reduces the credit constraint but does not 
fully remove it over the domain 
T A − 0 . More specifically, 
the subsidy causes the credit constraint to be no longer 
binding over the interval 
s c A A − , and to constrain the 
land productivity less over the domain 
T s A A − . Beyond 
c A , the vertical distance between Dc. and Dcs increases 
with land renting. Graphically this is reflected in the fact 
that over this domain the land demand function without 
subsidy (Dc) is not parallel with the land demand with 
subsidy (Dcs).  
In drawing Dcs we assumed that the credit constraint is 
still binding over the area 
T s A A − . If the subsidy effect 
would be so strong to remove the constraint over the whole 
T A − 0  domain, the land demand function would shift to 
s D  and the resulting land rent would be 
*
s r . However, it is 
important to realize that even if the second effect has only a 
small impact on the land demand, the combined effect will 
be that the land rent goes up by more than the subsidy s.  
 
Proposition 2: When farms are homogenous and are credit 
constrained, it holds that with the introduction of area 
payments (and with  0 > α ) all farms lose. 
Proof: the proof can be obtained from authors. 
 
The graphical analysis is in figure 2. To simplify the graph 
and the discussion, we consider the extreme case when the 
subsidies fully solve the credit constraint (the formal 
analysis hold for the general case). The subsidy shifts 
demand to  s D  and land rent to 
*
s r . Farms gain from 
subsidies and from improved productivity with reduced 
credit constraints; they lose from the increase in land rents. 
First, the farms’ gains from subsidies equal area ABCE and 
this is identical to the losses from the “direct” effect of the 
subsidies on land rents (also area ABCE). So these two   5 
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effects exactly offset each other. Second, the farms’ gains 
from improved productivity with reduced credit constraints 
equal area CFG. The farms’ losses from the “indirect” 
effect on land prices is represented by area CGHJ. The net 
effect is always negative: the net losses to farms equal area 
CFHJ, which is the difference between area CGHJ, which 
is equivalent to area CGKE (indirect loss), and area CFG 
(productivity gains).
9  
The intuition behind this result is as follows. While the 
subsidy is the same for all land, this is not the case for the 
effect of the credit constraint. If the farms would use land 
up to 
c A , there would be no additional effect of the credit 
constraint reduction on land rents. Beyond 
c A , the effect of 
the credit constraint on farm productivity ( 0 > AK f ) 
increases with land renting. The productivity loss is 
represented by the distance between the D and  c D  
functions, which increases with land use. The gap is highest 
at 
T A .  
Reducing the credit constraint has the strongest effect at 
the margin, where the credit constraint is strongest, and 
where the land rent is determined. At the margin the 
increase in productivity with reduced credit constraints 
equals the additional increase in land rents. However for the 
rest of the land this is not the case. As a consequence the 
gains in land productivity are lower than the increase of the 
land rent for all the land except for the unit at the margin.  
 
Proposition 3: When farms are credit constrained it holds 
that with the introduction of area payments (and with 
0 > α ) total welfare increases. 
Proof: the proof can be obtained from authors. 
 
The welfare effects are also illustrated in figure 2. 
Landowners gain from the higher rental price. Their gains 
are equal to area ABGK. Area ABCE is the size of the total 
subsidy, which equals the taxpayers’ cost. The net losses to 
farms equal area CFHJ. From the assumption of a small and 
open economy, with fixed prices for fertilizer, output, and 
fixed interest rates, it follows that the welfare of fertilizer 
suppliers, credit suppliers and consumers will not be 
affected by the subsidies. Hence, the total welfare effect is 
positive and equals area CFG. Total welfare increases 
because the subsidies solve the credit market imperfection 
and thereby increase productivity, and total production. 
                                                           
9 Note that these changes incorporate adjustments in fertilizers use 
and that the welfare change represented by area CFHJ in figure 2 
is an accurate representation of farm profit change induced by the 
subsidy. (see Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004 for a general 
discussion and applications to different issues). 
 
Notice that in this specific case there are no deadweight 
costs because the land supply is assumed fixed and all land 
receives subsidies. Hence, there are no distortions in land 
allocation.  
A. Heterogeneous farms 
The analysis so far assumed that farms were identical. 
We will now relax this assumption. For simplicity we 
consider the situation when there are two farms who differ 
in their credit constraints.
10 
The effect of differences in credit constraints on the land 
allocation and the land rent is illustrated in figure 3. The 
land demand curves of farm 1 and farm 2 without credit 
constraints are D
1 and D
2 and their land use is A
1 and A
2, 
respectively,  with 
1 2 A A A
T − = .  The equilibrium 
without credit constraint is (
* *,r A ). When credit is 
constrained, the land demand curves of farm 1 and farm 2 
shift to Dc
1 and Dc
2, respectively. The new equilibrium 
shifts to (
* *, c c r A ). The land market rent declines, 
* * r rc < . The change in land allocation between farms 
depends on the farms’ relative credit constraints. In the case 
illustrated in figure 3, farm 2 is assumed to be more credit 
constrained than farm 1. As a result, farm 2 renting is lower 
by 
* * A Ac − , compared to the unconstrained equilibrium. 
  
Proposition 4: When farms differ in their credit constraints, 
it holds that with the introduction of area payments (and 
                                                           
10 Empirical evidence shows important differences among farms in 
their credit constraints. For example, Bierlen and Featherstone 
(1998) find in the US that a farms’ debt levels are the strongest 
determinant of credit constraints, while asset size and age are less 
important. Benjamin and Phimister (2002) find that differences in 
the structure of agricultural credit markets alter farm credit 
constraints. They find that in the case of the UK where non-
specialized commercial banks dominate and with little government 
interventions, farms with less collateral were more credit 
constrained, while in France with dominant specialized 
agricultural cooperative bank and with extensive government 
interventions, farm credit is less dependent on collateral. Closer 
relationships between the cooperative bank and farms in France 
address better information asymmetry and reduce the reliance on 
collateral. Bezemer (2003) finds in the case of the Czech Republic 
that long-established and larger corporate farms have better access 
to credit than small individual farms. Latruffe (2005) finds in the 
case of Poland that farmers with more assets were less credit 
constrained than others. This may differ from the situation in more 
developed market economies. 
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with  0 >
i α ), the farms that are less credit constrained 
will loose and farms that are more credit constrained may 
gain.  
Proof: the proof can be obtained from authors. 
 
With area payment s, farm 2 land demand shifts upwards, 
from Dc
2 to Dcs
2. Farm 1 demand shifts from Dc
1 to Dcs
1 
(figure 3). As explained earlier, we have two effects. First, 
farm 1 and 2 land demand shift to Dcs1
1 and to Dcs1
2, 
respectively, because of the direct subsidy effect which 
increase marginal returns to land. This results in a higher 
land market rent, rcs
s. The increase in rent is equal to the 
size of the subsidy s (rcs
s - rc
* = s) and affects both farms 
simultaneously. Second, because farms can use subsidies to 
buy more fertilizers, this increases the marginal productivity 
of land and thus land demand. This indirect effect results in 
a further shift of farm 1 land demand from Dcs1
1 to Dcs
1, and 
for farm 2 from Dcs1
2 to Dcs
2. The equilibrium is (Acs
*, rcs
*). 
It is clear from figure 3 that the rent rises by more than the 
subsidy (rcs
* - rc
* > s) as in the case with homogenous 
farms.  
However now the impact differs between the two farms. 
While both farms see their credit constraint reduced and 
will increase fertilizer use and thereby increase their 
productivity, this effect is stronger (at the margin) for the 
farm which has the strongest marginal productivity losses 
due to credit constraints. The farm which is most credit 
constrained before receiving the subsidy, i.e. farm 2, will 
increase its land use because it benefits most from the 
reduction in its credit constraint, leading to higher land 
marginal productivity gains. The farm which is less credit 
constrained, i.e. farm 1, definitely loses because its increase 
in land rental costs  ) (
* *
c cs r r −  is higher than the increase in 
marginal return of land for every hectare it rents (the 
distance between 
1
cs D  and 
1
c D  is smaller than  ) (
* *
c cs r r −  
for land renting equal to or smaller than 
*
cs A ). Its total 
losses are equal to area JKL minus area CEGK (<0).
  The 
farm which is most credit constrained, i.e. farm 2 in figure 
3, may gain or may lose, depending on whether the increase 
in returns to land (the distance between 
2
cs D  and 
2
c D  for 
land renting smaller than
*
cs
T A A − ) are larger or smaller 
than the increase in land rent  ) (
* *
c cs r r − . In figure 3 it is 
unclear whether area LMON minus area EFHM is positive 
or negative – and this result holds in general.  
If the differences in credit constraints are small, both 
farms will lose. As an illustration of this, notice that in the 
extreme when differences are small, we end up with the 
case of homogenous farms. As we have shown before, all 
farms will lose from area payments in this case (see 
propositions 1 and 2). However, if there is a sufficiently 
large difference in credit constraints, and hence a 
sufficiently strong productivity effect at the margin for the 
most constrained farm (farm 2), farm 2 may gain. 
Moreover, while farm 1 will always lose, under specific 
conditions it is possible that the aggregate impact on farms 
is positive, i.e. that the sum of area JKL and area LMON is 
larger than the sum of area CEGK and area EFHM. This 
may occur in the case when farms that are less credit 
constrained have very elastic land demand and farms that 
are more credit constrained have a relatively high increase 
in productivity induced by more fertilizer use. In this case 
the indirect effect of subsidies on the equilibrium land rent 
is small while credit constrained farms have high 
productivity gains (see Ciaian and Swinnen (2007) for a 
formal analysis). In other cases farms are likely to lose on 
aggregate. 
IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES AND HOUSEHOLD 
EFFECTS 
To analyze the sensitivity of our findings to some of our 
assumptions, we use a simple simulation exercise. We 
simulate the model with homogenous farms, using a Cobb-
Douglas production function, 
2 1 β β K BA Q = , where B  is 
a constant and  1 β  and  2 β  are input parameters.  
Data for France were used to calibrate the model. We 
use average data for 2003 and 2004 (sources are European 
Commission and Eurostat). Total agricultural output was 
used as proxy for Q, non-land costs were used as proxy for 
K , and utilized agricultural area was used as proxy for  A. 
The cost share of land in total costs of agricultural 
production  1 β  was calculated from the Farm Accountancy 
Data Network (FADN) and equals approximately 0.1. This 
is lower than the value which Alston (2007) used (land cost 
share equal to 0.2) in a simulation model for the US. 
However, other studies also use lower land cost shares for 
the EU than for the US. OECD (2000) estimates the land 
cost share for different crops in the EU between 0.14 and 
0.18, and in the US between 0.21 and 0.27. The GTAP 
model for grains uses a land cost share of 0.12 for the EU 
and 0.2 for North America (van Meijl and F. van Tongeren, 
1999). Given the fact that France is relatively land abundant 
within the EU, its land cost share can be expected to be 
even smaller than the EU average. We use 0.1, but will vary 
this parameter to asses the sensitivity of the results. With a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, the cost share of non-
land inputs in total costs of agricultural production  2 β  was   7 
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0.9. To account for the credit constraint, we used 
estimations of Blancard et. al (2006) to set the shadow price 
of the credit constraint equal to 1.35. We also vary this 
parameter. 
  Consistent with the theoretical model our base 
simulation model has a fixed land supply and infinitely 
elastic output demand and fertilizer supply. We then relax 
these assumptions with simulations using different 
elasticities of land supply, output demand and fertilizer 
supply. Following Alston (2007) we use land supply 
elasticities of 0.1 and 0.2. The most commonly used values 
of output demand elasticities in the literature are between -
0.1 and -0.7 (e.g. Floyd 1965; Hertel, 1989; Tiffin and 
Tiffin, 1999; de Crombrugghe et. al, 1997; Van Driel, 
Nadall, and Zeelenberg, 1997; OECD, 2000; FAPRI). We 
use variations in output demand elasticities of -0.3, -0.7 and 
infinity. Supply elasticities of non-land inputs in the 
literature vary widely: between 0.1 and 3 (Balcombe and 
Prakash, 2000; Floyd 1965; OECD, 2000; Ryan and 
Duncan, 1974; Thijssen, 1988), because it covers a wide 
range of inputs (e.g. fertilizers, fuel, labour) which have 
various reactions to prices. It also depends whether inputs 
are farm supplied or purchased. Purchased inputs tend to be 
more elastic than farm supplied inputs. In our simulations 
we will use 0.5, and 1.5, and infinity.  
The results are summarized in table 1. The numbers 
represent losses or benefits from the introduction of area 
subsidies measured as a share of total subsidies. The results 
are consistent with the theory. The basic simulation shows 
that farms loose (-12%), while landowners gain more than 
the subsidy (178%) with a fixed land supply and with 
infinitely elastic output demand and fertilizers supply. Total 
welfare increases by 67% of the subsidy amount.  
Models 2 and 3 show that with lower elasticity of non-
land input supply non-land input producers (i.e. capital 
input suppliers) get part of the rents (20% to 33%). As a 
result, slightly less policy rents are transferred to 
landowners but farms lose even more (-53% to -81%). Also 
welfare increases less (+20% to +40%).   
A similar effect occurs with less elastic output demand. 
Now consumers also benefit from the subsidy (+165 to 
+381%) while most of these consumer benefits come from 
strong decreases in farm surplus (-160% to -355%), and less 
effects on landowners and total welfare.   
With more elastic land supply (model 6 and 7) farms 
gain, but only limited: from 1% to 13%. These gains come 
from landowners whose gains are lower.   
A higher α  implies higher losses to farms (-18) 
because the “indirect” productivity effect increases with α . 
Landowners benefit more: +217% in model 9.
11 A higher 
1 β  (hence lower 2 β ) (model 10) also implies larger losses 
to farms (-24%) and higher gains to landowners (+190%). 
Benefits from policy to landowners increase with the 
importance of land in the production. On the other hand, 
with credit constraint, the increase in productivity (and 
increase in land prices) caused by the alleviation of credit 
constraint decreases with lower  2 β . In the simulation in 
table 2 the former effect is stronger then the latter effect. 
Finally, from a policy perspective it is obviously 
important when interpreting these distributional effects 
whether “farms” and “landowners” are the same persons (or 
households), or not. These structural conditions differ 
strongly around the world (Swinnen, Stanley, and Vranken, 
2006). For example, farms rent more than 65% of their land 
in EU countries like Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Belgium 
and France. Many landowners are living in urban areas. In 
contrast, in countries such as Ireland, Poland, Latvia, and 
Italy, on aggregate farms own more than 70% of their land. 
The situation in the US is in between both groups of 
countries.  
To measure the implications, table 2 presents 
simulations results for three scenarios: farms own 25%, 
50%, or 75% of their land, respectively. The results in table 
2 show that land-owning-farms gain from area payments 
except (a) when they own relatively little land (25%) and 
the supply of non-land inputs is inelastic and (b) when 
demand is inelastic. The latter is an important result since 
this applies to most developed countries, and farming 
households even lose when they own most of their land 
(75%). 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In this article we have shown that imperfections in rural 
credit markets may strongly affect the incidence of 
agricultural policy. When farms are credit constrained, the 
introduction of area payments will lead to even larger gains 
for landowners as land rents will increase by more than the 
subsidy.  This is because the subsidies will reduce farms’ 
credit constraints and thereby increase marginal 
productivity of land and thus land demand. This will 
increase land prices in addition to the direct subsidy effect.  
The effect of area payments on farm profits with 
homogenous farms is negative. Farms gain directly from the 
subsidy and indirectly from the increase in productivity. 
                                                           
11 Notice that with  0 = α  all policy benefits go to landowners. In 
this case farms cannot use subsidies to alleviate their credit 
constraint; and the results are identical to the case when there are 
no credit constraints. .   8 
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However they lose from the increase in land rents. The land 
rent increase is larger than their gains, causing a negative 
net impact.  If farms are heterogeneous, the most credit 
constrained farms (ex ante) and those which are most 
effective in using the subsidies for the reduction of their 
credit constraints may gain. 
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Table 1 Simulation results 
Surplus change as a share of subsidy expenditure [X/(s*A
T)] (%) 














Landowners Consumers Welfare 
gain 
1 0.5  0.1 ∞  0  -∞  -12 0  178  0  67 
                   
2 0.5  0.1 1.5  0  -∞  -53 20  173  0  40 
3 0.5  0.1 0.5  0  -∞  -81 33  170  0  22 
4 0.5  0.1 ∞  0 -0.7  -160 0  161  165  66 
5 0.5  0.1 ∞  0 -0.3  -355 0  138  381  65 
6 0.5  0.1 ∞  0.1  -∞  1 0  163  0  66 
7 0.5  0.1 ∞  0.2  -∞  13 0  151  0  65 
8 0  0.1  ∞  0  -∞  0 0  100  0  0 
9 0.75  0.1  ∞  0  -∞  -18 0  217  0  100 
10 0.50  0.2  ∞  0  -∞  -24 0  190  0  67 
Source: own calculations   11 
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Table 2. Farm household surplus change (as share of subsidy expenditures) under different assumptions of household land 
ownership  
Change in farm household surplus with 










elasticity  25% 50%  75% 
1 0.5  0.1  ∞  0  -∞  32 77  121 
               
2 0.5  0.1  1.5  0  -∞  -10 33  77 
3 0.5  0.1  0.5  0  -∞  -39 4  46 
4 0.5  0.1  ∞  0 -0.7  -120  -80  -40 
5 0.5  0.1  ∞  0 -0.3  -320  -286  -251 
6 0.5  0.1  ∞  0.1  -∞  42 83  124 
7 0.5  0.1  ∞  0.2  -∞  51 88  126 
8 0  0.1 ∞  0  -∞  25 50  75 
9 0.75  0.1  ∞  0  -∞  36 90  145 
10 0.50  0.2  ∞  0  -∞  23 71  118 
Source: own calculations 
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